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ABSTRACT
We analyze experimentally the eects of external interven-
tions such as subsidy and targeting on investment decisions,
during an intervention and after. We employ a multi-period
version of the trust (investment) game Berg et al. (1995)
introducing either monetary incentives for contribution or
providing a suggestion about the level of investment. The
results of the experiment indicate that targeting is an ef-
fective instrument to promote trustful behavior while sub-
sidy policy is eective in neither the short- or the long-run.
Therefore, we suggest a targeting policy should be consid-
ered as an instrument to foster trustful behavior.
JEL Classication: C92, L50, D80
1 Introduction
In 1998, Stanford University licensed its PageRank patent to one of
its newly established spin-o companies. This investment resulted in
the emergence of one of the worlds' largest high-tech companies Google
ISSN XXXX-XXXX; DOI XXXXXXXX
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which quickly revolutionized the world market. In addition to its public
economic impact, this investment has brought private nancial benets
to Stanford involving to a large extent voluntary nancing of research
scholarships and collaborative projects.1
The success of Google illustrates why governments often intervene
to try to foster academic spin-o creation and knowledge commercial-
ization. This intervention typically takes the form of a two-phase sub-
sidy policy: (i) a subsidy for university initial spin-o investment, and
(ii) additional government funding if the spin-o proves successful.2
Alternative interventions such as targeting are rarely considered
even though they may not involve subsidy spending. Also, since policy
makers tend to focus on the immediate eects of policy, potential long-
term post-intervention costs are also not considered. In this paper we
ll this gap conducting a controlled laboratory experiment which allows
a direct comparison of the short- and long-run eciency of dierent
policies.
In this experiment, we analyze the eects of external interventions
such as subsidies and targeting on investment decision both during and
after the intervention. We employ a multi-period version of the trust
(investment) game (Berg et al., 1995) introducing monetary incentives
or suggesting a level of investment. The experiment consists of three
blocks, the second of which features policy intervention. This allows
the assessment of the immediate and the post-intervention eects.
In the non-monetary intervention, we exploit the experimenter de-
mand eect in line with previous research on the inuence of tax
frame" (Sugawara and Nikaido, 2014; Karakostas and Zizzo, 2016; Pel-
ligra et al., 2016; Silverman et al., 2014). In the context of our study,
this approach has considerably higher external validity than, for in-
stance, assigning authority to a subject, since our aim is to model
government policy rather than the peer pressure eect. Also, it in-
creases internal validity because we can set up the level of suggestion
1For instance, in 2008, Google paid approximately $1,881,400 to Stanford Uni-
versity of which only $426,950 related to licensing of patents. The largest part 
some $1,246,000  took the form of donations for scholarships and other philan-
thropic endeavors (Wikinvest.com, 2009).
2 See, e.g., programs such as Small Business Technology Transfer (SBTT)
in the United States and Existenzgründungen aus der Wissenschaft (EXIST) in
Germany.
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exogenously.
In this respect, Pelligra et al. (2016) most resembles the suggestion
treatment part of our experiment. However, Pelligra and colleagues
are interested in how the experimenter request aects trustworthiness
and nd that it systematically decreases it. Silverman et al. (2014)
also exploit suggestion but in a public good game, while Sugawara
and Nikaido (2014) ask to act with respect to expectations rather than
suggestion and Karakostas and Zizzo (2016) use requests to induce
anti-social behavior.
With respect to monetary interventions, in a paper most closely
related to the subsidy treatment part of our study Charness et al. (2008)
show that cooperative behavior in trust games increases if a third-party
(third player) is able simultaneously to reward the trustor and punish
the trustee. This raises concerns if the eect is driven by punishment,
reward, monitoring or expectations of reward or punishment.
Fiedler and Haruvy (2017) try to address these issues by providing
some evidence that the eects of third player monitoring, reward, and
punishment on cooperative behavior are comparable. However, in their
experiment they do not dene the reward (punishment) rules, thus,
their data provide little information on whether behavior changes as the
results of expectations (threat) of reward (punishment), beliefs about
the expected level of investment, or reaction to incentives.
We take a dierent line: We introduce a subsidy exogenously and
vary the thresholds for receiving the subsidy (setting it either above or
below the average trust level without intervention). Hence, we study
the eect of subsidies on trust and trustworthiness directly. This is
both interesting from a theoretical viewpoint and important from a
policy perspective: Subsidy policies rely on dened (written) rules.
The study provide four main original contributions. It is the rst to
analyze the eect of non-monetary intervention in form of third-party
suggestion about trust ; Second, it compares the eect of non-monetary
and monetary interventions and explains the dierence in how they
perform; Third, it analyzes the long-run eects of external interventions
on trustful behavior; and fourth, it is to our knowledge the rst paper
to analyze the rule-based eect of a third-party monetary reward on
trust.
We address the following research questions: (1) Does a non-monetary
intervention such as suggestion increase investment activity during and
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after its implementation? (2) Is subsidy policy an ecient means to
foster investment activity in the short-run? (3) Is a low level of invest-
ment required to receive a subsidy detrimental to an investment? (4)
Does a subsidy policy have a negative impact on investment levels after
the policy termination?
We nd that non-monetary interventions in the form of suggestion
increase investment activity during the intervention and even though
this eect might be short lived, we nd no indication of subsequent
detrimental eects. We nd also that a subsidy policy does not sig-
nicantly aect the level of trust, the amount returned, or the level of
trustworthiness in either the short- or the long-run. We associate the
ineectiveness of subsidy policy to two regularities: Subjects show low
propensity to follow this policy and if subjects follow it, they mostly
send the lowest amount required to get the subsidy. From a welfare per-
spective (net payos), however, we nd that targeting policy increases
net payo, but no evidence that the targeting policy outperform the
subsidy policy.
We provide indirect evidence of the ineectiveness of monetary in-
tervention due not to the presence of the subsidy itself, but rather to
the fact that the monetary reward is conditioned on a certain behav-
ior: Subjects that unconditionally receive subsidies do not show signi-
cantly dierent levels of trustworthiness. We conclude that a targeting
policy should be considered an eective tool to foster investment activ-
ity or, in other words, to nudge higher levels of investment.
2 Further Related Literature
The paper builds on four literature strands. First, it is related to work
on the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. From
Titmuss (1970) early research on blood donation to Andreoni (1993)
experiment on public good provision, these studies point out the po-
tential detrimental eects of external interventions on intrinsic moti-
vation. For instance, in a meta-analysis of experimental studies on
external incentives and intrinsic motivation, Deci et al. (1999) indicate
the presence of negative eects that are particularly relevant in the case
of tangible rewards.
However, Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) come to a dierent con-
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clusion based on the evaluation of the results of 50 experiments on the
relation between incentives and social preferences. They nd that the
eect of incentives depends on the pre-existing social framework and
can be both negative and positive. Gneezy et al. (2011) extend this
discussion urging to consider both the potential long-term costs and
benets of external interventions.
The second literature strand looks at the role played by trust in in-
vestment decisions. Trust is involved in almost every economic transac-
tion (Arrow, 1972) and the empirical evidence suggests that it is crucial
for venture capital investments (Bottazzi et al., 2011) and mutual in-
vestment decisions (Felli et al., 2010), and is associated positively to
the level of investment across countries (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
The trust (investment) game we employ for our experiment mir-
rors an investment situation with imperfect contracts. The behavior in
this game varies across countries with dierent economic characteristics
(Johnson and Mislin, 2011). In addition, in this game the trustful be-
havior correlates with dierences in the investment propensity between
countries  for instance, between Germany and France (Willinger et
al., 2003) or the Gulf region and Western countries (Bohnet et al.,
2010)  which make possible to better understanding the variation in
investment rates across nations.
The thid stream of work includes studies of the interaction between
external incentives and trustful behavior. Fehr and List (2004) nd that
a not used threat to punish increases trustworthiness, whereas punish-
ment crowds out trustworthy behavior. It has been shown also, that
the threat of potential contract enforcement crowds in trustworthiness
(Bohnet et al., 2001), but trustworthiness is decreasing in presence of
sanctioning (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). Houser et al. (2008) recon-
cile these ndings by showing that the eect of sanction depends on the
relation between the amount requested and the level of the sanction,
not the intentions. In addition, Li et al. (2009) show that behavioral
change under sanctions can be attributed to a perception shift to-
wards more utility-based reasoning.
In the specic case of subsidies and trustful behavior, the eort
exerted by agents is aected non-monotonically by additional compen-
sation (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000), and if the principal imposes a
lower bound on the eort, agents mostly exerts eort at this bound
(Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). Interestingly, Gachter et al. (2011) show
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that the eort exerted increases in the presence of both a ne or a
bonus, but that in the latter case subjects tend to choose an eort that
is not higher than the best-reply level condition.
However, the eect of incentives on principals' actions (trust) re-
mains unclear. Charness et al. (2008) attempt to ll this gap by allow-
ing a third-party (third player) to both reward the principal and pun-
ish the agent. Their experimental results support the hypothesis that
the threat of punishment increases trust and trustworthiness. However,
the eect of reward on trust (principal's action) remains ambiguous, al-
though Fiedler and Haruvy (2017) provide experimental evidence that
third player monitoring, punishment or reward all have a similar eect
on trust and trustworthiness.
The fourth set of studies looks at the eect of non-monetary in-
centives on trust. A seminal paper by Berg et al. (1995) provides
evidence that an aggregated information on previous behavior  av-
erage amount sent, returned and net return from other subjects 
can strengthen trustful relations. Similarly, Thöni and Gächter (2015)
show that peer eects have a signicant inuence on the trust level and
suggest conformism as an explanation of this phenomenon.
Bracht and Feltovich (2009) provide additional evidence that in-
formation on others' previous actions can enhance cooperation, but
they report little eect of cheap-talk messages. However, Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) show that promises increase cooperation in
a one-shot trust game.3 Schotter and Sopher (2006) show that inter-
generational advice decreases trust levels, but increases trustworthiness
in one-shot (per generation) trust game. Finally, Pelligra et al. (2016)
directly exploit the eect of experimenter's request on trustworthiness
and show that request provide some wiggle room and thus decreases
trustworthiness.
3 Theory and Implications
3.1 The Game
We use a version of the trust (investment) game. In the original trust
game (Berg et al., 1995), two players interact: player 1 (trustor) de-
3In addition, Duy and Feltovich (2010) nd that in the two-player game of
Chicken recommendation by a third-party aects subjects' behavior.
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cides how much of his initial endowment E to send (give) to player 2
(trustee). The amount sent s is multiplied by a certain factor m and
player 2 receives the multiplied sum. In turn, player 2 chooses how
much of the amount received to return R. See gure 1 for a depiction




1 : π “ E ´ S





1 : π “ E ´ S `R
2 : π “ E `m ¨ S ´R
E
Figure 1: Trust (investment) game.
In our version of the investment game, we introduce an external
intervention devised alternately as a subsidy or a suggestion. The sub-
sidy Z is obtained by both players if the contribution of player 1 is
greater than or equal to a certain threshold T (gure 2 depicts this
version of the game). In the suggestion case, no subsidy is available
but the suggestion is to send not less than a threshold level.
The game is played for several periods and comprises three blocks.
Blocks 1 and 3 consist of repetitions of the standard trust game, while
block 2 includes the interventions.
In what follows, we outline a simple model to develop the theoretical
predictions and hypotheses.
3.2 Trust under External Incentives
To derive the theoretical predictions, we apply backward induction solv-
ing the model from the second stage. We denote by v the value that the








1 : π “ E ´ S `R






1 : π “ E ´ S `R` Z
2 : π “ E `m ¨ S ´R` Z
S ě T
E
Figure 2: Trust (investment) game with subsidies.
trustor expects to receive back in the second stage of the game. This
value is a function of the amount sent s. Thus, the utility function of
the trustor takes the form:
u “ E ´ cpsq ` vpsq ` opsq ` I, (1)
where E is the player's endowment, c is the individual's cost of send-
ing an amount s, o is the trustor's other-regarding preferences which
depend on s, I is the eect of external incentives which can take the
form of either subsidy or suggestion.
Let us begin the analysis with the subsidy policy which is character-
ized by a tuple of parameters pZ, T q, indicating respectively the size of
the subsidy and the threshold (minimal) amount that the player must
send to obtain this subsidy.
The subsidy osets the costs of sending but can aect other-regarding
preferences. We assume that other-regarding preferences are aected
by a measure λ ă 0.4 Thus, the utility function in the presence of a
4This assumption is in line with previous experimental results. See Bowles and
Polania-Reyes (2012) for a discussion.
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subsidy policy is
u “ E ´ cpsq ` vpsq ` opsq ` 1tsěT urZ ` λopsqs, (2)
where the indicator 1tsěT u “ 1 if s ě T and zero otherwise.
The players maximize their utility so that the marginal costs of
sending are equal to the marginal benets (values are expressed in










∆1tsěT urZ ` λopsqs
∆s
, (3)
To analyze the eect of a subsidy policy, we compare it to the case
of no incentives. The subsidy is contingent on the relation between the
threshold and the amount sent. Therefore, we consider two states (1)
when the amount to be sent without incentives s0 is lower than the



















∆s if s0 ě T
(4)
It is easy to see that it is benecial to send more if the amount to
be sent without incentives s0 is lower than the threshold T and the
direct eect of the subsidy Z∆s is larger than the crowding out eect of
the subsidy λ∆opsq∆s . However, if s0 ă T , there is no direct subsidy eect
(the subsidy is independent from additional sending, Z∆s “ 0), while the
negative eect of the subsidy on other-regarding preferences persists,
λ∆opsq
∆s ă 0. Therefore, we ca formulate the following hypotheses:
H 1. The amount sent is higher in the presence rather than the absence
of external monetary incentives if (1) the threshold level is higher than
the amount sent in the case without the incentives s0 ă T and (2)





H 2. The amount sent is lower in the presence rather than the absence
of external monetary incentives if the threshold level is higher than the
amount sent in the case without the incentives s0 ă T .
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Concerning the targeting policy (suggestion), this also is character-
ized by a threshold level T (the suggested minimal amount to be sent).
The policy does not use subsidy but players obtain an utility by com-
plying with the authority (Karakostas and Zizzo, 2012).5 We denote
this utility by A (which is independent from s). Thus, the senders'
utility is
u “ E ´ cpsq ` vpsq ` opsq ` 1tsěT upAq, (5)
Analyzing the players' utility function in the case of targeting policy














∆s if s0 ě T
(6)
If the amount sent in the case without the incentives is lower than
the threshold s0 ă T the players benet from complying with authority.
Therefore, they can sacrice part of their endowment to follow the
suggestion. However, when s0 ą T they do not benet since the utility
is independent of the amount sent.
H 3. The amount sent is higher in the presence rather than the absence
of external non-monetary incentives if the threshold level is higher than
the amount sent in the case without the incentives s0 ă T .
Considering the long-run (post-intervention) eect of incentives, we
assume that preferences are endogenous (Bowles, 1998), meaning that
the preferences learned under certain circumstances persist. Given this,

















∆s if s0 ě T
(7)
There is no direct eect of the subsidy Z since the subsidy pol-
icy is no longer present. However, other-regarding preferences remain
negatively aected λ∆opsq∆s ă 0. Thus, we formulate:
5In Karakostas and Zizzo (2012), the information communicated by a third-party
aects the behavior of the subjects. The authors attribute this eect to compliance
with authority. We suppose that suggestion has a similar eect.
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H 4. The amount sent is lower after experiencing external monetary
incentives than without them.















∆s if s0 ě T
(8)
If the threshold level is higher than the amount sent in the case
without the incentives s0 ă T , the players send more after the target-
ing policy since they continue to gain utility by complying with the
authority A∆s ą 0.
H 5. The amount sent after experiencing external non-monetary in-
centives is higher than without them if the threshold level is higher than
the amount sent in the case without the incentives s0 ă T .
3.3 Trustworthiness under External Incentives
We can represent the trustee's utility function in the following way:
u “ 1´ cprq ` oprq ` I, (9)
where cprq is the trustee's cost of returning the ratio r “ Rm¨s , o is the
other regarding preferences which change with r, and I is the eect of
external intervention (subsidy or suggestion).6
We assume that trustees maximize their utility. Since external in-
tervention depends on the trustor's behavior but not on the trustee's











BrBs ą 0. Therefore, we can formulate the following hypothe-
sis:
H 6. The trustworthiness rate r is not dierent during and after the
external intervention compared to the case without it when conditioned
on the amount sent by the trustor s.
6We assume that o is independent from Z since (1) the subsidy is provided by
a third-party and (2) both players receive it.
12 Igor Asanov and Simone Vannuccini
4 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted in the Max Planck Institute of Eco-
nomics laboratory in Jena (Germany) in April 2013. Seven sessions
were run, each lasting about 60 minutes and employing 32 experimen-
tal subjects. Experimental subjects were recruited using the ORSEE
system (Greiner, 2015), and the experiment was programmed and im-
plemented with the help of z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
During the experiment, subjects play various versions of the trust
game for 30 periods. In each period, they have an endowment of 100
points, E “ 100, and the sum that they send is tripled, m “ 3.
The experiment is subdivided into three blocks of 10 periods each.
The rst and the third blocks were the same for all subjects  they
faced the standard trust game. However, in the second block, subjects
played dierent versions of the trust game depending on the treatment
to which they were randomly assigned: SUBLOW, SUBHIGH, SUG-
GEST, CONTROL.
In the second block of the SUBLOW treatment, subjects can obtain
a subsidy of 20 points, Z “ 20, if the amount sent by the trustor exceeds

















Figure 3: SUBLOW treatment parameters.
The SUBHIGH treatment diers from the SUBLOW treatment only
in the threshold level: To obtain the subsidy the trustor needs to send
not less than 70, T “ 70 (see gure 4).
















Figure 4: SUBHIGH treatment parameters.
In the SUGGEST treatment  the case of the targeting policy
 the subsidy is absent in all blocks but in block 2 the experimenter
suggests the player to send not less then 70, so T “ 70 as in the
















Figure 5: SUGGEST treatment parameters.
In the CONTROL treatment, the standard trust game without any
















Figure 6: CONTROL treatment parameters.
We ran all four treatments (varied between subjects) during the
same session to control for session-specic eects. We displayed treatment-
specic information (amount of subsidy and threshold level) on the
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computer screen, together with information about both players en-
dowment; this information was shown in each period.7 Subjects were
randomly assigned to the treatment, and to the roles of trustor or
trustee. They retained their roles throughout the whole experiment
and were randomly matched to other players in the same treatment
in each period of the experiment (stranger matching design). Subjects
were informed that they would be randomly matched to a new player
in each period (the matching algorithm was implemented accordingly),
but were given no information on the number of treatments in the ses-
sion. Thus, they could not predict to whom they would be matched
except that it would be a dierent player in each period. The order of
matching was random but identical in all four treatments within the
same session. That allows us to reduce the potential eects of the his-
tory of the interaction. We kept the roles constant and used stranger
matching because, in our view, this design captures the situation of a
university's repeated but independent decisions to engage in spin-o
activities.
The subjects received payments privately at the end of the exper-
iment according to the points they gained in one randomly selected
period of the game.8 Points were converted to Euros at the rate of 10
points for e 0.35.9 Subjects could send (back) any amount of points.
In the control questions section of the experiment we showed an ex-
ample situation with a random number of amount sent (back), which
can take any possible value within the endowment. There could be a
concern that the conversion rate might have distorted incentives (for
the amount of fty Euro cents). However, we observed that subjects
sent any value in the range 0 to 100 at least once, and returned (sent
back) almost any value in the range 0 to 300 (subjects were allowed to
send only whole points). Including a participation fee of e 2.50, sub-
jects earned on average e 6.81 with a minimum e 2.5 and a maximum
e 15.5.
7Additionally, we provided on the screen a game customized calculator, so that
a subject could see for a given sending how many points (s)he keeps and how much
the other player will receive and have conditional on the amount returned. Also,
the screen showed an history of an individual's choices and payos.
8We used this scheme to avoid the endowment eect. See Azrieli et al. (2012)
for an analysis of incentive schemes in experiments.
9The experimental points were rounded up to nearest 50 cents in nal payments.
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Table 1: Participants characteristics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Age 224 24.15 4.04 18 22 26 48
Share of Females (B) 224 0.49 0.50 0 0 1 1
Exp. Interesting 224 2.54 1.25 1 2 3 5
Exp. Length 224 2.30 0.87 1 2 3 5
Exp. Understandable 224 4.14 1.17 1 4 5 5
Task diculty 224 2.27 1.56 1 1 3 8
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive data on the subjects and their
perception of the experiment obtained via the questionnaire adminis-
tered at the end of each experimental session. We almost perfectly
balanced the sample with respect to gender across the experiment (ra-
tio of female participants: 0.49) and across sessions (ratio of female
participants per session: 0.47, 0.5, 0.5, 0.47, 0.47, 0.53, 0.5). Our sam-
ple also covers a wide range of age groups from 18 to 48 although most
participants were relatively young (median age: 23.5).
In terms of experiment complexity, subjects reported a fairly good
understanding of instructions with an average value of 4.14 on a 1 to 5
scale and low task diculty, with mean 2.27 on a 1 to 10 scale.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive Analysis of Trust, Amount Returned, and Trust-
worthiness.
To assess subjects' behavior, we rst compare the average amount sent
in each round across treatments. Figure 7a plots the average amounts
sent over the game. The average amount sent across all the treatments
in block 1 is similar to other studies and equals to 40.24.10 A visual
inspection shows no evident dierences in trust levels in block 1 across
the four treatments. This is expected since subjects play the same
standard trust game in all four treatments.
10See Johnson and Mislin (2011) for a meta-analysis of experiments based on
trust games.
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Figure 7: Average amount sent (a) and amount returned (b) by treatment.
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Let us now consider behavior during the policy intervention  block
2. It is clear that subjects send more on average in the treatment SUG-
GEST than in any other treatment. The suggestion eect is especially
strong in the rst period of the intervention: The average amount sent
in the rst period of the intervention tends towards the suggested level
of 70 points, s̄SG “ 68.46, which is far above the average amount sent
in the control group, s̄CL “ 46.61 (Standardized Eect Size, Cohen's
d11=0.581). The dierence stays positive during the intervention but
in the last period of the intervention it reduces, reaching a level compa-
rable to the control group (s̄SG “ 46.04 vs. s̄CL “ 35.82; Standardized
Eect Size, Cohen's d20=0.239). Thus, the suggestion policy seems to
be very eective although its eect is decreasing over time.
It can be seen that the curve of the average amount sent in the
treatment with suggestion is always above the corresponding curve for
the treatments with subsidy during the intervention. However, the plot
does not show any dierence between the amount sent in the treatments
with subsidy and the control treatment.
An interesting pattern emerges after the policy intervention. In
block 3 the average amount sent in the SUGGEST treatment contin-
ues to exceed the corresponding value in the CONTROL treatment
until the last periods of the game. However, the amount sent in the
SUBHIGH treatment is lower than in the CONTROL treatment. The
average sent in SUBLOW treatment is similar to the corresponding
amount in CONTROL treatment.
To obtain a clearer picture of the dierences among treatments, we
plot the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) for each of the three
blocks (see gure 8). The CDFs indicate the proportion of cases where
the amount sent is lower than a certain value, allowing a detailed view
of the distribution of the amounts sent.
Again, we observe no substantial dierence between the treatments
in block 1 but we observe a very dierent shape of the distributions in
block 2. It is not dicult to identify discontinuities corresponding to
the values of the low threshold (T “ 30) for the treatment SUBLOW,
the high threshold (T “ 70) for the treatment SUBHIGH and the
suggested amount to be sent (T “ 70) for the treatment SUGGEST.
The changes observed are related to the policy intervention.
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Figure 8: Cumulative distribution of amount sent by treatment.
Interestingly, we observe very dierent distributions of the amount
sent for the SUBHIGH and SUGGEST treatments if we look at the val-
ues that exceed 70 (the high threshold level or the suggested amount
to send). In the SUGGEST treatment subjects do not send just the
suggested minimal level, but continue also to send higher values, while
among subjects in the SUBHIGH treatment only a few send contribu-
tions higher than that required for the subsidy. A potential explanation
for this pattern is a crowding out eect (appendix B.4 provides some
supporting evidence).
As concerns block 3, we can observe that the curve of the cumula-
tive distribution function for the SUBHIGH treatment lies above the
curve of the CONTROL treatment, while the curve for the SUGGEST
treatment is below the curve for the CONTROL treatment.
To further understand the eect of the dierent policies during the
intervention, we analyze how the amount sent changes in dierent treat-
ments depending on the original level of trust. To do this, we plot the
average amount sent in block 1 (unaected by any policy) against the
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average amount sent in block 2 for each trustor (see gure 10a).
The plot shows a strong relationship between the average amounts
sent in blocks 1 and 2. More importantly, we can see that subjects send
more under the suggestion treatment (the crosses on the plot) across
all levels of initial trust. This is reected in an upward shift of the
SUGGEST treatment regression line (black line) which lies parallel to
the CONTROL regression line (black dashed-dotted line).
However, we do not observe a similar uniform reaction to the SUB-
HIGH (grey squares) and SUBLOW (grey triangles) treatments across
dierent levels of initial trust. Instead, we observe a shift of the re-
gression line on the plot for the subsidy treatments (grey lines) but the
gradual slope of this line indicates that the behavior of subjects with
an initial high level of trust changes to a lower extent than in other
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Figure 9: Relation between average amount sent (s̄) in Block 1 and Block 2 with
(a) linear and (b) loess smoothed conditional means.
We investigate the non-homogeneous eect of the interventions con-
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ditional on the dierence in the initial trust level by plotting loess
smoothed conditional means (see gure 10b). Loess curves indicate
a similar pattern: Subjects send more under the SUGGEST (black
curve) than the CONTROL treatment across dierent levels of initial
trust (taking into account that they are constrained by the endowment
of 100 points). However, the plot additionally shows the non-linear
reaction in case of the subsidy (SUBHIGH), with a spike occurring at
around the initial level of trust of 25 points.
Taken together, these observations indicate that under the SUG-
GEST treatment subjects send more across all levels of initial trust
and send more than the minimum requested amount, whereas under
the subsidy policy only a few subjects provide a contribution that is
higher than requested. This pattern explains why the average amount
sent under the SUGGEST treatment is higher than the average amount
sent in the CONTROL treatment while we do not observe a higher av-
erage contribution under the subsidy policy compared to the control
condition (see gure 7).
We conclude the descriptive analysis by discussing how much play-
ers 2 (trustee) send back (see gure 7b). We can see that the average
amount returned mirrors the amount sent across all treatments. More
importantly, the amount returned reects the amount sent also during
the intervention. That is, under the subsidy policy trustees do not
decrease the return level and under the suggestion policy subjects re-
turn a higher amount in correspondence to the amount they receive.
Thus, trustees continue to reciprocate trust despite the external inter-
vention.11
To assess whether the rate of return corresponds proportionally to
the amount sent, we calculate the ratio of the amount sent back by
player 2 to the amount received by that player  the trustworthiness
rate, r “ R3¨s . As expected, we observe no dierence in trustworthiness
between treatments (see Appendix B.2). The stability of trustworthi-
ness across the treatments allow us to focus on analyzing the eects of
external interventions on trust and the overall eciency of the policy.
11We also study if the amount returned depends on the level of initial propensity
to return (see appendix B.1). Again, we observe that the amount returned mirrors
the amount sent across dierent levels of initial propensity to return. In the SUB-
HIGH treatment it appears that subjects with an initial high level of propensity to
return tend to send less, even though they continue to reciprocate.
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5.2 Regression Analysis of Trust, Amount Returned, and Trust-
worthiness
To assess the signicance of our results, we provide a regression anal-
ysis using a mixed eects model with random eects for individual
subjects. We estimate the dierence in the amount sent (trust level)
across treatments by running the following regression in block 1:
s “ β0 ` βSGSUGGEST ` βSLSUBLOW ` βSHSUBHIGH`
` υi `mp ` εi,t, (11)
where SUGGEST , SUBLOW , SUBHIGH are dummy variables equal
to 1 for the corresponding treatments, υi is the random eect for sub-
ject i, mp is random eect for matching pair, and εi,t is the error term
for subject i in period t.12 For blocks 2 and 3 we run a similar regres-
sion to 11 but add the average amount sent in the block 1 per subject
(s̄i,B1) to account for variance in subjects' propensity to sent:
s “ β0 ` βSGSUGGEST ` βSLSUBLOW ` βSHSUBHIGH`
` βs̄s̄i,B1 ` υi `mp ` εi,t, (12)
Adding the average amount sent in the block 1 (baseline measure)
improves the statistical power and increases the precision of the esti-
mates.13 The results are reported in table 2.
In line with our expectations and the pattern observed in gure 7
we nd no signicant dierence at any conventional level in the rst ten
periods. The behavior should not dier since there is no intervention
in the rst ten periods (block 1).
Now let us consider the eect of the intervention. We observe that
during block 2 subjects send signicantly more in the SUGGEST than
in the CONTROL treatment (p “ 0.02 corrected for multiple com-
parisons with Dunnet procedure  MPC corrected; βSG “ 13.873).
To understand the eect of the suggestion policy in more detail we
scrutinize the intervention by period by running a non-parametric ex-
act Wilcoxon test across aggregated averages of the amounts sent over
12As a robustness check, we estimated a linear regression with robust standard
errors clustered on subjects and matching pairs (for all linear mixed-eects speci-
cations). Our results hold also using this specication.
13We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this idea.
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Table 2: Determinants of Sending (s)  estimation of equations 11, 12
Sent (s)
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
SUGGEST 0.91 13.87˚˚ 5.02
(8.87) (5.17) (4.36)
SUBHIGH ´8.92 10.23 2.88
(8.85) (5.26) (4.34)
SUBLOW ´2.70 6.82 6.49
(8.85) (5.08) (4.25)
Average Sent in Block 1 (s̄i,B1) 0.82
˚˚˚ 1.01˚˚˚
(0.06) (0.05)
Constant 42.91˚˚˚ 5.09 ´8.49˚˚
(6.27) (4.37) (3.68)
Observations 1,120 1,120 1,120
Akaike Inf. Crit. 10,263.60 10,139.00 9,902.80
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 10,313.80 10,194.20 9,957.98
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Dunnet adjusted
p-values for multiple comparisons: ˚p ă 0.1,˚˚ p ă 0.05,˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
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the sessions in the SUGGEST and CONTROL treatments for each pe-
riod in block 2.14 We see that in the rst period of intervention the
suggestion policy has a large statistically signicant eect (period 11:
p “ 0.041, r “ z?
N
“ 0.547) but that this eect fades gradually (pe-
riod 12: r “ 0.453; 13: r “ 0.378; 14: r “ 0.224; 15: r “ 0.242)
and loses statistical signicance (Period 12: p “ 0.09; 13: p “ 0.157;
14: p “ 0.402; 15: p “ 0.365 ). When we test the dierence between
the SUGGEST and CONTROL treatments for the succeeding periods
(16-20) using the same Wilcoxon test, the eect remains positive; how-
ever, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis at any conventional level of
signicance for any of those periods. Thus, we conclude that the tar-
geting policy achieves its goal and positively aects the level of sending
although only in the short-run.
The eect of the subsidy policy is less evident. We cannot reject
the null-hypothesis that the average amount sent in the treatments
with subsidies is the same as the average amount sent in the control
treatment in block 2 (SUBHIGH: p “ 0.129 corrected for MPC with
Dunnet procedure; βSH “ 10.233; SUBLOW: p “ 0.396 MPC cor-
rected; βSL “ 6.817). If we compare the amount sent in the subsidy
treatments to the control treatment applying to each period the non-
parametric Wilcoxon test across aggregated averages over the sessions,
we also see no eect of this policy in the short-run.15 Put dierently,
we nd no evidence of subsidy policy being an eective means of pro-
moting trustful behavior in the short-run.
As a nal note related to the eects of interventions on trust, we
point out that these eects can be inuenced by senders' heteroge-
neous response. We nd some suggestive trace of non-linearities in the
descriptive analysis. As the mass of sendings seems to move towards
the treshold levels during the external intervention, we investigate this
issue in the appendix B.4. In any case, our evidence on the average
treatment eect  the generalised lift-up in sendings following the
policies  remains the focus of this paper.
14Throughout the paper we estimate the exact Wilcoxon test based on the Shift
Algorithm by Streitberg and Röhmel (1986).
15SUBHIGH VS. CONTROL, Period 11: p “ 0.644, r “ 0.124; 12 : p “ 0.931; r “
0.023; 13: p “ 0.71; r “ 0.099; 14: p “ 0.533; r “ 0.167; 15: p “ 0.513; r “ 0.175.
SUBHLOW VS. CONTROL, Period 11: p “ 0.597, r “ 0.141; 12: p “ 1, r “ 0; 13:
p “ 0.71; r “ 0.099; 14: p “ 0.646, r “ 0.123; 15: p “ 0.692; r “ 0.106
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In block 3, we nd no signicant post-intervention eects. The
amount sent in the control treatment does not dier signicantly from
the amounts in any other treatment.16 However, the coecients of all
three treatment are positive which suggests no detrimental long-lasting
eects of any of the policies we tested.
We conclude this section by analyzing the evolution of the amount
returned R in absolute terms, and the trustworthiness rate r. At rst,
similar to (11) we estimate the following regression for the amount
returned in block 1:








` υi `mp ` εi,t (13)
Similar to (12) we add the average amount returned in block 1
(R̄i,B1) to the estimations for blocks 2 and 3:







` βR̄R̄i,B1 ` υi `mp ` εi,t (14)
We see that in block 2 the amount returned is signicantly higher
in the SUGGEST compared to the CONTROL treatment (p “ 0.009
MPC corrected; βRSG “ 22.33). In the case of the subsidy treatments
we nd no evidence that trustees change their behavior during the
intervention. The amount returned is signicantly higher in block 3
SUBLOW treatment (p “ 0.06 MPC corrected; βrSL “ 15.649). In
sum, trustees reciprocate trust in all treatments both during and after
the intervention, but send more in absolute terms under the suggestion
policy.
16We also nd no signicant dierences if we compare the treatments to each
other.
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Table 3: Determinants of the amount Returned (R)  estimation of equations 13, 14
Returned (R)
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
SUGGEST 1.28 22.33˚˚˚ 12.00
(10.34) (7.60) (7.09)
SUBHIGH ´12.74 15.25 7.24
(10.27) (7.85) (7.01)
SUBLOW 0.36 8.32 15.65˚
(10.23) (7.50) (6.86)
Av. Returned in B. 1 (R̄i,B1) 0.89
˚˚˚ 0.78˚˚˚
(0.07) (0.06)
Constant 51.27˚˚˚ 0.28 ´8.49
(7.28) (6.51) (5.91)
Observations 1,120 1,120 1,120
Log Likelihood ´5,995.61 ´5,841.07 ´5,744.68
Akaike Inf. Crit. 12,011.20 11,704.10 11,511.40
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 12,061.40 11,759.30 11,566.50
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Dunnet adjusted
p-values for multiple comparisons: ˚p ă 0.1,˚˚ p ă 0.05,˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
It is possible that trustees return a disproportionate amount com-
pared to what they receive (e.g. this might apply to the case where
subsidy or suggestion crowd out trustworthiness). This, in turn, can
reduce the trustor's contribution. To address this concern, in the next
regression we assess the determinants of trustworthiness (r “ R3¨s):
17







` βss` υi ` εi,t (15)
In line with the theoretical predictions, over the entire experiment
we nd no signicant dierences in trustworthiness rate among the
CONTROL, SUBHIGH, and SUGGEST treatments (see appendix B.2).
17In regression 15 we control for the amount sent (s) since not only the amount
returned but also trustworthiness (proportion returned) depend on the amount sent
(see the meta-analysis of the trust game in Johnson and Mislin, 2011). However,
the results remain robust even if the amount sent is not included.
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Lack of dierence in trustworthiness during the intervention is evidence
that the policy does not crowd out trustworthiness: Trustees return a
proportional amount (reciprocate trust) under policy intervention as
under control condition. It is especially interesting that we observe no
dierence in trustworthiness between the treatments with subsidy and
control during the intervention period: The subjects exposed to sub-
sidy do not change their behavior signicantly. This suggests indirectly
that unconditional subsidies do not produce a crowding out eect.
To sum up, the suggestion (targeting) policy increases the amount
sent in the short-run, while we nd no evidence that subsidy policies
alter the amount sent in a statistically signicant way. Given that in
all treatments trustees return an amount that is proportional to the
amount they received, a suggestion policy seems to be a more attrac-
tive tool from a social welfare perspective. In the next subsection, we
examine this nding in more depth focusing on the welfare eect of the
interventions.
5.3 Net Payo
To obtain insights into the welfare impact of our interventions, we con-
sider how the reaction to dierent policies is reected in the variation
in net payos. More precisely, we evaluate the eect of each policy on
the average net payo πN , that is, the dierence between the subject's
payo and the value of the subsidy the subject receives: πN “ π ´ Z.
We subtract the value of the subsidy to account for the third party's
cost, given that our focus is on the social welfare eect of the policy,
not on the individual benet.18 The following mixed-eect model is
estimated for block 1:







` βTRTR` υi `mp ` εi,t, (16)
where SUGGEST , SUBLOW , SUBHIGH are dummy variables that
are equal to 1 for the corresponding treatments. TR is a dummy vari-
18The eects of policies on gross payos are reported in appendix B.3. Results
show that even if we do not account for third-party costs, the individual payos under
the subsidy policies are comparable to the payos under the suggestion. However,
under the subsidy policies subjects receive an additional payo simply by exploiting
the subsidy.
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able that is equal to 1 for the trustor and 0 for the trustee, υi is the
random eect for subject i, mp is the random eect for matching pair,
and εi,t is the error term for subject i in period t. We estimate a
regression similar to (16) for blocks 2 and 3 and add the average net
prot from block 1 pπNi,B1q to account for the variance in prots across
subjects:







` βTRTR` βpiπNi,B1 `mi ` υi ` εi,t, (17)
The results are reported in table 4, panel A.
As expected, for block 2 we nd a signicant increase in net pay-
os as a result of the targeting policy (p “ 0.028 MPC corrected;
βπSG “ 13.254). However, we nd no signicant eect of subsidy dur-
ing the intervention compared to the control, although both coe-
cients for this type of intervention are positive (SUBHIGH: p “ 0.169
MPC corrected; βπSH “ 9.566; SUBLOW: p “ 0.507 MPC corrected;
βπSL “ 5.809 ). As a robustness check, we estimate a similar regression
to (16) and (17), but, now, we interact player type (Trustor, Trustee)
and the treatment dummy to account for the heterogeneous reaction of
dierent types of players to the treatment (table 4, Panel B). The re-
sults remain unchanged (p “ 0.041 MPC corrected; βπSG “ 17.693). We
cannot reject the null-hypothesis that dierent types of players receive
dierent net payos depending on the treatment.
Finally, to understand whether the targeting policy outperforms
any of the subsidy policies in the short-run (during block 2) in terms







cannot reject the null-hypothesis at any conventional signicance level
(p “ 0.329).
In sum, from a welfare perspective, we nd evidence of the benet
derived from a targeting policy in the short-run compared to no inter-
vention, but no evidence of benet from a subsidy policy.19 However,
we nd no evidence to support the idea that the suggestion (targeting)
policy outperforms the subsidy policies.
19We provide a potential explanation in appendix B.4.
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Table 4: Determinants of Net Payo pπN q by block  estimation of equation 16, 17
Net Payo pπN q
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Panel A: Assuming Homogeneous Reaction of Trustor and Trustee
SUGGEST 0.61 13.25˚˚ 6.47
(5.98) (5.15) (5.73)
SUBHIGH ´2.20 5.81 5.97
(5.95) (4.97) (5.57)
SUBLOW ´8.75 9.57 2.33
(5.96) (5.26) (5.77)
Trustor (TR) ´64.38˚˚˚ ´19.64˚˚˚ ´12.18˚˚
(4.21) (5.13) (5.66)
Av. Net Payo in B.1 pπNi,B1q 0.83
˚˚˚ 0.85˚˚˚
(0.06) (0.06)
Constant 175.19˚˚˚ 32.16˚˚˚ 19.34
(4.72) (10.81) (11.99)
Panel B: Assuming Heterogeneous Reaction of Trustor and Trustee
SUGGEST 0.80 17.69˚˚ 7.81
(7.51) (7.29) (8.11)
SUBHIGH ´6.17 9.37 2.54
(7.46) (7.05) (7.90)
SUBLOW ´12.88 15.00 ´0.46
(7.47) (7.45) (8.18)
SUGGEST ˆ Trustor (TR) ´0.29 ´8.88 ´2.67
(10.62) (10.31) (11.47)
SUBHIGH ˆ Trustor (TR) 8.27 ´7.10 6.84
(10.56) (9.96) (11.17)
SUBLOW ˆ Trustor (TR) 8.37 ´10.82 5.51
(10.56) (10.49) (11.51)
Trustor (TR) ´68.53˚˚˚ ´12.88 ´15.05
(7.49) (8.22) (9.25)
Av. Net Payo in B.1 pπNi,B1q 0.83
˚˚˚ 0.84˚˚˚
(0.06) (0.06)
Constant 177.21˚˚˚ 28.46˚˚ 21.44˚
(5.30) (11.39) (12.68)
Observations 2,240 2,240 2,240
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Dunnet adjusted p-values
for multiple comparisons: ˚p ă 0.1,˚˚ p ă 0.05,˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
Our analysis falls under the broad rubric of studies on monetary and
non-monetary incentives and social preferences. We developed a model
that predicts that a policy involving monetary incentives may be inef-
fective, as such crowd out other-regarding preferences for those subjects
that comply with the policy. We assume that preferences are endoge-
nous (Bowles, 1998)  once learned, a preference persists for some
time. Therefore, a monetary intervention which eradicates social pref-
erences has a negative eect on subjects' pro-social behavior after the
intervention. In contrast, a policy using non-monetary incentives is mo-
mentary benecial and also has no long run detrimental consequences
because it does not aect other-regarding preferences.
The experimental results show that non-monetary incentives in
form of suggestion are eective to foster pro-social behavior in the very
short-run. They nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) people into trust-
ful behavior (higher investment and absolute returns) in the short-run,
while there is no evidence of any detrimental eects in the long-run.
In contrast, monetary incentives do not show eectiveness in either the
short- or the long-run although the policy signicantly aects the sub-
jects' behavior during the intervention. To interpret this we turn to
the taxonomy of incentive eects on preferences proposed by Bowles
and Polania-Reyes (2012).
Their categorization refers to three mechanisms linking interven-
tions and preferences: bad news  incentives provide information
about a principal's interests, control aversion  incentives jeopardize
self-determination, and moral disengagement  incentives activate a
switch from pro-social to own payo maximization mode of thinking.
While we cannot completely rule out the role played by bad news, we
focus on how control aversion and moral disengagement might explain
the specic pattern of subjects' reactions to the subsidy policy.
Subjects respond to the monetary intervention but (1) their propen-
sity to follow it is low and (2) those who follow the policy send the
minimal amount required to obtain the subsidy. We attribute the low
propensity to follow the policy to the mechanism of control aversion:
Subjects perceive the policy as controlling and avoid following it. Moral
disengagement could explain why subjects mostly send the minimal
amount: They switch their mode of thinking to maximization of their
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own payo, hence, if they decide to follow the policy they minimize
their costs by sending the minimum amount. Moral disengagement
can occur also if subjects consider the subsidy as too low (Gneezy
et al., 2011). Although we designed the incentive scheme in such a
way that the subsidy covers half of the average amount sent (or more
than half of dierence between average amount sent and the minimum
amount required to receive it), we cannot rule out the low response to
the subsidy policy being due to the level of incentive provided.
In relation to the post-intervention eect of the policies, despite
nding no signicant dierences among treatments after the policy in-
terventions, we observe that the targeting policy has the persisting
eect of inducing subjects to send high amounts. This is interesting
since it suggests that a targeting policy is likely potentially to have a
long-lasting eect. However, this needs to be tested in further research.
It is interesting also that the trustworthiness rate is not aected
either during the intervention or afterward. On the one hand, this is in
line with the theory  the trustee's behavior should remain the same
since the policies incentivize only trustors. On the other hand, given
that trustees also receive the subsidies, this suggests that the presence
of a subsidy is insucient to crowd out other-regarding preferences.
Rather, it is likely that crowding out occurs if the monetary incentives
are conditioned on a certain behavior.
To conclude, we studied how subsidy and targeting (suggestion)
policies aect trust (investment) in a trust (investment) game. We
provided suggestive evidence that targeting is an eective instrument
to promote trustful behavior, but only in the short-run; therefore, we
recommend that a targeting (suggestion) policy should be considered
as an instrument to foster (at least momentary) trustful behaviour.
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A Instructions
A.1 Player 1, Trustor.
Welcome to the experiment!
Thank you very much for participating. We hope that you feel
comfortable. We ask you to remain quiet and do not communicate with
any other player. Please understand that in case you communicate with
other players we will have to exclude you from the experiment without
payment. If you have any questions please raise your hand and wait
for the experimenter to come to you.
We guarantee that all information collected during the experiment
undergoes a strict anonymity process. It ensures anonymity among
players and that you stay anonymous to the experimenter.
During the experiment you will see information about other players.
We have ensured that you cannot identify them personally as well as
they cannot identify you.
The experiment is on decision-making. Your earnings will depend
partly on your decisions and partly on the decisions of other players.
You will have to make one decision in each round of a simple game
which consists of 30 rounds.
In each round of the game the earnings will be calculated in points.
At the end of the experiment one round will be randomly chosen.
The points gained during this round will be converted to Euros with
the following rate:
10 points = 0.35 Euro
In addition, you will receive 2.50 euro as a compensation for showing
up on time. The game you will play is divided into three blocks (A,
B and C), with 10 rounds in each block.
In each round of any block you will be matched with another ran-
domly chosen player among other participants. There will be a new
random pair each round.
The information about your previous decisions will not be revealed
to other players at any round of the experiment.
In each round you and the other player both will be endowed with
100 points. You can send any amount to the other player. Each
point you send is tripled. The other player will decide how many
points to send back to you and how many points to keep (from zero to
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the tripled sum you sent).
[For the SUBHIGH and SUBLOW treatment we add the following
paragraph]
Also, in some blocks if you send not less than a certain mini-
mum, you and the other player will receive an additional payment.
The amount of the additional payment and the required minimum
sent to receive it will be specied in the beginning of each block.
[For the SUGGEST treatment we add the following paragraph]
In some blocks it will be suggested to send not less than a certain
amount. The amount suggested is specied at the beginning of each
block.
A.2 Player 2, Trustee.
Welcome to the experiment!
Thank you very much for participating. We hope that you feel
comfortable. We ask you to remain quiet and do not communicate with
any other player. Please understand that in case you communicate with
other players we will have to exclude you from the experiment without
payment. If you have any questions please raise your hand and wait
for the experimenter to come to you.
We guarantee that all information collected during the experiment
undergoes a strict anonymity process. It ensures anonymity among
players and that you stay anonymous to the experimenter.
During the experiment you will see information about other players.
We have ensured that you cannot identify them personally as well as
they cannot identify you.
The experiment is on decision-making. Your earnings will depend
partly on your decisions and partly on the decisions of other players.
You will have to make one decision in each round of a simple game
which consists of 30 rounds.
In each round of the game the earnings will be calculated in points.
At the end of the experiment one round will be randomly chosen.
The points gained during this round will be converted to Euros with
the following rate:
10 points = 0.35 Euro
In addition, you will receive 2.50 euro as a compensation for showing
up on time. The game you will play is divided into three blocks (A,
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B and C), with 10 rounds in each block.
In each round of any block you will be matched with another ran-
domly chosen player among other participants. There will be a new
random pair each round.
The information about your previous decisions will not be revealed
to other players at any round of the experiment.
In each round you and the other player both will be endowed with
100 points. You will receive some amount of points from the other
player. Each point sent by the other player is tripled. You can
decide how many points to send back to him and how many points to
keep (from zero to the tripled sum of points the other player sent).
[For the SUBHIGH and SUBLOW treatment we add the following
paragraph.]
Also, in some blocks if the other player sends not less than a cer-
tain minimum, you and the other player will receive an additional
payment. The amount of the additional payment and the required
minimum sent to receive it will be specied in the beginning of each
block.
[For the SUGGEST treatment we add the following paragraph]
In some blocks, it will be suggested to other player to send not
less than a certain amount. The amount suggested is specied at the
beginning of each block.
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B Additional Analysis
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Figure 10: Relation between average amount returned (R̄) in Block 1 and Block 2
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Figure 11: Average trustworthiness by treatment.
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Table 5: Determinants of trustworthiness  estimation of equation 15
Trustworthiness (r)
Block1 Block 2 Block 3
SUGGEST 0.01 0.04 0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
SUBHIGH ´0.004 0.03 0.05
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
SUBLOW 0.08 0.09 0.10
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Sent (s) 0.001 0.001˚˚˚ 0.001˚˚˚
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Constant 0.26˚˚˚ 0.26˚˚˚ 0.22˚˚˚
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 864 853 683
Log Likelihood 170.50 309.72 214.27
Akaike Inf. Crit. ´319.01 ´597.45 ´406.55
Bayesian Inf. Crit. ´266.69 ´545.27 ´356.84
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Dunnet
adjusted p-values for multiple comparisons: ˚p ă 0.1,˚˚ p ă
0.05,˚˚˚ p ă 0.01








Table 6: Determinants of trustworthiness  estimation of equation 18
Trustworthiness (r)
Block1 Block 2 Block 3
SUGGEST 0.02 0.06 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
SUBHIGH ´0.01 0.04 0.06
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
SUBLOW 0.07 0.07 0.09
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Constant 0.34˚˚˚ 0.32˚˚˚ 0.26˚˚˚
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 864 853 683
Log Likelihood 146.59 293.83 203.46
Akaike Inf. Crit. ´275.17 ´569.66 ´388.93
Bayesian Inf. Crit. ´232.36 ´526.97 ´348.24
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Dunnet
adjusted p-values for multiple comparisons: ˚p ă 0.1,˚˚ p ă
0.05,˚˚˚ p ă 0.01










Table 7: Determinants of Gross Payo pπq  estimation of equation 19
Gross Payo pπq
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
SUGGEST 0.61 6.50 6.47
(5.98) (4.46) (5.73)
SUBHIGH ´2.20 10.27˚ 5.97
(5.95) (4.43) (5.57)
SUBLOW ´8.75 7.01 2.33
(5.96) (4.50) (5.77)
Player (P) ´64.38˚˚˚ ´12.41˚˚˚ ´12.18˚˚
(4.21) (4.50) (5.66)
Av. Gross Payo in B1 pπ̄i,B1q 0.87
˚˚˚ 0.85˚˚˚
(0.05) (0.06)
Constant 175.19˚˚˚ 21.35˚˚ 19.34
(4.72) (9.50) (11.99)
Observations 2,240 6,720 2,240
Akaike Inf. Crit. 24,340.70 71,806.50 24,005.00
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 24,403.50 71,888.30 24,073.60
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Dunnet adjusted p-values
for multiple comparisons: ˚p ă 0.1,˚˚ p ă 0.05,˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
B.4 Crowding Out and Eect of Threshold
We wish to understand the heterogenous response to the dierent policy
and potential cause of ineciency of subsidy. To do that, we focus on
the distribution of the amount sent in the treatments with dierent
policy but with identical threshold level: SUBHIGH and SUGGEST.
At rst, we look at the subjects' general propensity to follow the
subsidy and the targeting policy. We compare the probability that
subjects send an amount that is greater or equal to 70 in the SUBHIGH
and SUGGEST treatments compared to the CONTROL treatment. We
Short- and Long-run Eects of External Interventions on Trust. 43
do this by estimating the following regression:
Prps ě 70q “ Lpβ0 ` βěSGSUGGEST ` β
ě
SHSUBHIGH`
` P̄ ri,B1ps ě 70q ` υiq, (20)
where L is a standard logistic function. The results are reported in
Table 8.
Table 8: Determinants Prps ě 70q by block  estimation of equation 20
Prps ě 70q
Block1 Block 2 Block 3
SUGGEST 0.10 2.54˚˚˚ 0.79
(1.53) (0.90) (0.77)
SUBHIGH ´1.74 2.19˚˚ ´0.17
(1.54) (0.87) (0.82)
P̄ ri,B1ps ě 70q 8.53 9.91
(1.26) (1.32)
Constant ´3.24˚˚ ´4.27˚˚˚ ´5.46˚˚˚
(1.32) (0.78) (0.83)
Observations 840 840 840
Akaike Inf. Crit. 563.58 576.62 390.38
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 582.51 600.29 414.05
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Dunnet
adjusted p-values for multiple comparisons: ˚p ă 0.1,˚˚ p ă
0.05,˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
We nd a signicant increase in propensity to follow the target-
ing policy in block 2 (p “ 0.0118 MPC corrected; βěSG “ 2.54; e
βěSG “
12.62). However, it is surprising to observe that subjects are signi-
cantly more likely to send the required amount also during the subsidy
policy (p “ 0.0094;βěSH “ 2.19; e
βěSH “ 8.95; ).
This result is puzzling since in block 2 we observe that subjects do
not send signicantly more on average in the SUBHIGH than in the
CONTROL treatment (see table 2 in section 5.2).20 We can partially
20As well as given that we observe no signicant growth in net payos during the
subsidy policy (see table 4 in section 5.3).
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explain this by the fact that subjects' propensity to follow the policy
tends to be lower in the case of the SUBHIGH than in the SUGGEST
treatment ( βěSH “ 2.19 ă β
ě
SG “ 2.54; β
ě
SH “ 2.19 ă β
ě
SG “ 2.54).
Thus, given the sample size, we may not capture the eect directly.
The observed pattern suggests that subsidy policy aects signi-
cantly the subjects' behavior but it is not that eective as the targeting
policy because subjects avoid to follow the subsidy policy. However, for
this explanation to be partially accepted, we needs to compare whether
the propensity to follow the policy is, indeed, signicantly lower in case
of subsidy treatment than in case of suggestion treatment. To do that,
we estimate the following regression using the SUBHIGH treatment as
a reference category:
Prps ě 70q “ Lpβ0 ` βěSGSUGGEST ` P̄ ri,B1ps ě 70q ` υiq (21)
We nd no signicant dierence in propensity to follow the policy
between the SUGGEST and SUBHIGH treatments in block 2 (p “
0.6346;βěSG “ 0.4; e
βěSG “ 1.49). This suggests that another source
of ineciency is possibly at work. To nd it we give a closer look
at the distributions of the sending in the SUBHIGH and SUGGEST
treatments.
We have mentioned in Section 5.1 that the distribution of the send-
ing in block 2 is dierent for the SUBHIGH and SUGGEST treatments.
Subjects tend to send not more than the minimum amount 70 required
to obtain the subsidy in the SUBHIGH treatment, while in the SUG-
GEST treatment subjects also send more than the minimum suggested
level (see gure 8). If this dierence is signicant, it explains why the
eect of the subsidy policy is not as large as the eect of the targeting
policy.
To assess the signicance of the observed disparity we evaluate
whether the probabilities to send an amount that is greater than 70
or equal to 70 are dierent between the SUBHIGH and SUGGEST
treatments. We estimate the following two logistic regressions using
the SUBHIGH treatment as a reference category:
Prps “ 70q “ Lpβ0 ` β“SGSUGGEST ` P̄ ri,B1ps “ 70q ` υiq (22)
Prps ą 70q “ Lpβ0 ` βąSGSUGGEST ` P̄ ri,B1ps ą 70q ` υiq (23)
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Table 9: Determinants of Prps “ 70q by block  estimation of equation 22
Prps “ 70q
Block1 Block 2 Block 3
SUGGEST 1.27 ´2.02˚˚˚ ´1.45
(1.29) (0.72) (1.13)
P̄ ri,B1ps “ 70q 15.51
˚ 13.31˚˚
(8.48) (5.43)
Constant ´6.81˚˚˚ ´1.84˚˚˚ ´4.59˚˚˚
(2.22) (0.49) (0.60)
Observations 560 560 560
Akaike Inf. Crit. 77.32 403.08 58.98
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 90.30 420.39 76.29
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ˚p ă
0.1,˚˚ p ă 0.05,˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
Table 10: Determinants of Prps ą 70q by block  estimation of equation 22
Prps ą 70q
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
SUGGEST 1.47 2.47˚˚˚ 1.49
(1.50) (0.84) (0.98)
P̄ ri,B1ps ą 70q 8.05
˚˚˚ 11.54˚˚˚
(1.39) (2.13)
Constant ´4.90˚˚˚ ´5.20˚˚˚ ´6.66˚˚˚
(1.68) (0.87) (1.26)
Observations 560 560 560
Akaike Inf. Crit. 376.11 346.89 255.87
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 389.10 364.20 273.19
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ˚p ă
0.1,˚˚ p ă 0.05,˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
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We report the results in tables 9 and 10. The probability of send-
ing exactly 70 is signicantly lower in the SUGGEST treatment com-
pared to the SUBHIGH treatment during block 2 (p “ 0.0049;β“SG “
´2.02; eβ
“
SG “ 0.13). In contrast, the probability of sending more than
70 is signicantly higher in the SUGGEST than in the SUBHIGH treat-
ment (p “ 0.0033;βąSG “ 2.47; e
βąSG “ 11.82).
Moreover, applying the non-parametric exact Wilcoxon test across
aggregated averages over the sessions, we reject the null-hypothesis that
there is no dierence in probability to send exactly 70 (p “ 0.0484) and
more than 70 (p “ 0.0484) between the SUGGEST and SUBHIGH
treatments during block 2.
In the SUGGEST treatment subjects tend to send more than 70
and, thus, contribute to the growth of the average amount sent. How-
ever, in the SUBHIGH treatment, subjects tend to fulll the require-
ment to obtain the subsidy but do not to send more, diminishing the
average level of contribution. Thus, the specic reaction to the subsidy
policy decreases its eectiveness.
